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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In recent years there have been significant developments in the use of 
empirical economic methods to study the likely competitive effects of mergers.
1  
These developments have been shaped by the increased use of unilateral effects 
analyses by the competition authorities, as is expressed in part in the 1997 Horizontal 
Merger Guidelines.  Such analyses evaluate the ability of the post-transaction firm to 
raise the prices of some or all of its (often differentiated) products through unilateral 
decisions and without resort to overtly collusive activities.
2   
Unilateral effects analyses encompass a broad set of issues that arise when the 
differentiated brands produced by the merging firms constitute the first and second 
choices for some group of customers.  Absent de novo entry or product repositioning, 
                                                 
* The authors are Director, LECG Inc., Cambridge, MA and Robert L. Bridges 
Professor of Law and Professor of Economics at the University of California, 
Berkeley, respectively.  Professor Rubinfeld served as Deputy Assistant Attorney 
General in the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice from June 1997 
through December 1998.  They wish to thank Jonathan Baker, Steven Brenner, 
Luke Froeb, Richard Gilbert, Jerry Hausman, Gregory Werden, and the referees for 
helpful comments; all errors remain their own.  
1 For a recent survey see Jonathan B. Baker and Daniel L. Rubinfeld, “Empirical 
Methods Used in Antitrust Litigation: A Review and Critique,” 1 J. Am. L. & Econ. 
Ass’n 383 (1999). 
2 The 1997 U.S. DOJ/FTC Horizontal Merger Guidelines and the 1995 USDOJ/FTC 
Intellectual Property Guidelines have also emphasized the potential effects of a 
transaction on innovation g enerally, and on the intensity of research and 
development efforts in particular.  (For a general discussion and further references, 
see Daniel L. Rubinfeld and John Hoven, “Innovation and Antitrust Enforcement,” 
in J. Ellig ed.,  Dynamic Competition and Public Policy, Cambridge University  
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a unilateral price increase may become profitable as the result of a merger if a 
substantial number of customers who previously would have been lost to competitors 
can now be retained because the merged firm also offers the customers’ second 
choice.  If, however, this “1–2” customer group is relatively small, then at best only a 
minimal price increase will be profitable.
3  In essence, the foregone profits from the 
lost sales to diverted customers would be comparable to the incremental profits from 
substantial price increases to customers that do not switch.   
In recent years, the technique known as “merger simulation” has emerged as a 
promising framework for this analysis.
4  Simulation uses economic models grounded 
in the theory of industrial organization to predict the effect of mergers on prices in 
relevant markets.  There is a common theoretical core to all simulation approaches in 
use today, although the details of a given simulation will depend on data availability 
and on the mathematical characterization of the market or markets at issue. 
While merger simulation is not a panacea for all of the economic issues that 
arise in a difficult transaction, it nonetheless can offer assessments of competitive 
effects and remedies that are beyond the reach of other methods of inquiry.  For 
example, simulation has been used to evaluate the likelihood that potential merger-
                                                                                                                                           
Press, 2001, Chapter 3.)  To our knowledge, merger simulation has yet to be applied 
to evaluate competitive issues that involve innovation markets explicitly. 
3 Unilateral effects simulation can predict price increases or decreases for a merger 
involving firms in the same market, depending on efficiencies and changes in 
market structure such as repositioning and divestitures.  
4 See, among others, Jerry Hausman, Gregory Leonard, and J. Douglas Zona, 
“Competitive Analysis with Differenciated Products,”  Annales D’Économie et de 
Statistique 34 (1994), Gregory J. Werden, “Simulating the Effects of Differentiated 
Products Mergers: A Practical Alternative to Structural Merger Policy,” 5 Geo. 
Mason L. Rev. 363 (1997); Carl Shapiro, “Mergers with Differentiated Products,” 
Antitrust Spring (1996) at 23; Gregory J. Werden, “Simulating Unilateral 
Competitive Effects from Differentiated Products Mergers,” Antitrust Spring (1997) 
at 27; Jerry A. Hausman and Gregory K. Leonard, “Economic A nalysis of 
Differentiated Products Mergers Using Real World Data,” 5 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 
321 (1997); see also, Gregory J. Werden “The Effects of Differentiated Products 
Mergers:  A Practitioners’ Guide,” in Julie A. Caswell and Ronald W. Cotterill, 
eds., Strategy and Policy in the Food System:  Emerging Issues 95 (1997), and 
Gregory J. Werden, “Simulating the Effects of Differentiated Products Mergers: A  
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specific efficiencies (associated with reductions in the marginal cost of production) 
are sufficiently great to offset predicted price increases.  Simulation can also be used 
to analyze the competitive effects of product repositioning and  de novo entry.  
Finally, simulation can help one to evaluate the adequacy of proposed divestitures.
5  
With time, we believe that simulation techniques will be better understood and more 
widely used by antitrust lawyers and economists.
6   
A variety of different economic models can be utilized as the basis for a 
simulation analysis.
7  When sufficient data are available, demand models can be 
estimated econometrically.  When these estimated-demand simulation models are not 
feasible, models requiring less data can be valuable if one is willing to make 
additional assumptions about the nature of demand.  The logit demand model and 
“PCAIDS”—a new model to be introduced in this paper—both fit into this 
calibrated-demand simulation model category.  We will suggest that PCAIDS offers 
advantages over a number of other calibrated-demand models. 
We have undertaken this review and update of work on merger simulation 
with a number of goals in mind.  First, we offer a relatively non-technical description 
of the principles of merger simulation—principles that are consistent with the 
methodologies currently in use by the competition authorities.  Second, we describe 
PCAIDS, the new calibrated-demand merger simulation methodology.  Third, we 
present examples that apply P CAIDS, including some applications that to our 
knowledge have not previously appeared in the literature on merger simulation.  
                                                                                                                                           
Practical Alternative to Structural Merger Policy,” 5  Geo. Mason L. Rev. 363 
(1997). 
5 In recent years the agencies have begun to look critically at remedies involving 
restructuring.  See, for example, “The Nature and Limits of Restructuring in Merger 
Review,” Remarks by FTC Chairman Robert Pitofsky, Cutting Edge Antitrust 
Conference, Feb. 17, 2000 (available at www.ftc.gov), and Richard G. Parker and 
David A. Balto, “The Evolving Approach to Merger Remedies,” Antitrust Report, 
May, 2000. 
6 For a lawyer’s assessment of merger simulation, see James F. Rill, “Practicing What 
They Preach: One Lawyer’s View of Econometric Models in Differentiated 
Products Mergers,” 5 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 393 (1997). 
7 For an overview of publicly available merger simulation tools, see 
www.antitrust.org/economics/mergers/simulation.html.   
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Fourth, we suggest how simulation analyses might be used to evaluate the safeharbors 
of the Merger Guidelines. 
Calibrated-demand models are relatively easy to implement and make detailed 
simulation feasible for nearly any transaction, since they require neither scanner nor 
transaction-level data.  The PCAIDS model, in particular, requires only information 
on market shares and reasonable estimates of two elasticities.  Estimates of these 
elasticities often can be obtained from marketing information or, when appropriate, 
through demand estimation.  As with any calibrated-demand simulation model, one 
can test the sensitivity of the PCAIDS results to changes in the values of the 
estimated elasticities and to other simulation parameters.   
We believe that calibrated-demand simulation models can offer valuable 
screening devices for “quick looks” by enforcement agencies and by merging firms.  
The models can be used to review the potential antitrust exposure resulting when 
unilateral effects issues are raised, but sufficient information is not available to 
estimate reliably a full set of cross-price elasticities.  The models can also offer a 
useful means of working out the implications of the range of qualitative judgments an 
analyst might make based on documentary and interview evidence, and to test the 
sensitivity of competitive effects predictions to plausible variations in those 
assumptions.  The analyses may be particularly useful for weighing opposing forces, 
as when comparing the potential anticompetitive loss of localized competition to the 
procompetitive gain relating to merger-specific efficiencies and product 
repositioning.   
The balance of this article is organized as follows.  Section II discusses the 
economic fundamentals of merger simulation.  Because the pros and cons of merger 
simulation have been extensively debated elsewhere, we do not undertake such a 
treatment here.  In Section III we introduce the PCAIDS approach to modeling 
demand.  We explain how a key assumption about the relationship between market 
shares and the diversion of lost sales from price increases can be used to calibrate the 
PCAIDS model.  Section IV offers some examples of merger simulation with 
PCAIDS that includes comparisons with other simulation models.  In Section V we 
show how PCAIDS can be applied to the analysis of product repositioning and entry.   
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Section VI presents an analysis of the Merger Guidelines safeharbors using PCAIDS 
simulation, and section VII contains some brief concluding remarks.  We have 
relegated the more technical mathematical details to the Appendix. 
II.  THE BASICS OF MERGER SIMULATION 
Merger simulation models predict post-merger prices based on information 
about a set of pre-merger market conditions and certain assumptions about the 
behavior of the firms in the relevant market.  Simulation models typically assume that 
firms’ behavior is consistent with the Bertrand model of pricing, both pre- and post-
merger.  According to this theory, each firm sets the prices of its brands to maximize 
its profit, while accounting for possible strategic, non-collusive interactions with 
competitors.  An equilibrium results when no firm can increase its profit by 
unilaterally changing the prices of its brands.  This equilibrium can be interpreted as 
the outcome of the interactions between each firm’s pricing decisions and its 
expectations of the price reactions of its competitors.
8   
Merger simulation requires a “demand model” that specifies the relationships 
between prices charged and quantities sold in the relevant market.  A reasonable 
demand model must satisfy a number of conditions.  The most basic is that the own-
price elasticities (i.e., the percentage change in quantity for a given percentage change 
in its own price) should be negative.  Increases in a product’s own price should 
reduce the quantity demanded of that brand.  Cross-price elasticities would normally 
be expected to be positive; a price increase for one brand normally leads to an 
increase in the quantity demanded of each of the remaining brands in the market (so 
long as the brands are economic substitutes for each other).
9   Implementation of the 
demand model requires particular values for these own and cross-price elasticities. 
                                                 
8 For a basic introduction to the “Nash-Bertrand” equilibrium, see, Robert S. Pindyck 
and Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Microeconomics, 5th Edition (2000), Chapter 12; a more 
advanced presentation appears in Jean Tirole,  The Theory of I ndustrial 
Organization (1988). 
9 In a general demand model there is no requirement that own-price elasticities be 
equal for the different brands or that cross-price elasticities take on particular 
values.  
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In addition, simulation models require assumptions about supply or, more 
specifically, about how total cost responds to incremental changes in post-merger 
output.  Most simulation analyses assume that incremental costs do not vary with 
output.  The effects of any merger efficiencies are analyzed by changing the level of 
incremental costs (keeping the assumption that the level of incremental cost does not 
change as output changes). 
A merger simulation analysis typically proceeds in two stages.  First, one 
assumes that the market shares and own-price and cross-price elasticities for each 
brand in the pre-transaction market are known.  The assumption of profit 
maximization then generates a set of mathematical “first-order conditions” (FOCs) 
that can be used to calculate pre-transaction gross profit margins for each brand.
10 
Second, one takes into account the fact that the merged firm in general will set 
different prices than the pre-merger firms, to the extent that the merger removes some 
competition or there are potential efficiencies.  The merged firm recognizes that, 
when it raises price on one of its brands, it keeps the profits from customers whose 
purchases are diverted to a brand of its merger partner.  The demand model translates 
these price changes into corresponding changes in margins, elasticities, and shares.  
This second step in essence involves solving for the price changes that generate post-
transaction margins, elasticities, and shares that are consistent with the merged firm 
maximizing the sum of its profits from all of the brands it now produces.
11   
                                                 
10 See Appendix equation (A1).  Using the first-order conditions to estimate margins 
avoids the distortions associated with the inclusion and allocation of fixed costs in 
accounting data, a particular problem for multi-brand firms.  Moreover, relevant 
accounting data are likely only to be available for the brands sold by the merging 
parties.  As a result, the FOC approach is particularly useful if one is to perform the 
simulation when there are more than two firms in the market and data sources are 
limited.  We note, however, that the FOCs may yield negative margins, which are 
generally not consistent with the assumption that goods are substitutes.  Because 
estimated margins depend on the price elasticities in the model, negative estimated 
margins could signal that the model is relying on inappropriate elasticities.   
11 See Appendix equations (A2) and (A3) for the solution to the relevant optimization 
problem.    
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III.  THE PCAIDS MODEL 
A.  Background: Almost Ideal Demand Systems 
Economists have explored a variety of demand models for merger simulation 
with a range of virtues: every model must strike a balance between theoretical rigor, 
tractability, and success in explaining the actual data.  As might be expected, the 
simulated price effects of a merger will depend on the particular demand model 
chosen.
12  A demand model that we find particularly appealing is the Almost Ideal 
Demand System, or “AIDS.”
13  AIDS is a widely accepted and intuitively reasonable 
model in economics that allows a flexible representation of own-price and cross-price 
elasticities.  Moreover, its economic properties are arguably superior to alternatives 
that have often been used in merger simulation, including linear, constant-elasticity 
(log-linear), and logit demand models.   
The major problem with AIDS is a practical one.  AIDS typically requires 
econometric estimation of a large number of parameters, and it is not unusual for the 
estimated cross-price elasticities to have low precision and algebraic signs that are 
inconsistent with economic theory.  We explain below how it is possible to 
implement a variant of the AIDS model in a manner that ensures the correct signs, 
without the use of complex econometric methods.  This simplicity is not costless, 
however, since PCAIDS requires additional structural assumptions beyond the AIDS 
model.
14  We believe that these costs  are often reasonable in comparison to the 
benefits associated with both the variety of applications that can be handled with 
PCAIDS or other calibrated-demand simulation models. 
A simple example with three independent firms, each owning a single brand, 
will help explain the logic of AIDS (and PCAIDS).  The AIDS model specifies that 
the share of each brand depends on the prices of all brands.  More formally, the share 
                                                 
12 See, Philip Crooke, Luke Froeb, Steven Tschantz, and Gregory Werden, “The 
Effects of Assumed Demand Form on Simulated Post Merger Equilibria,” Rev. of 
Ind. Org. 15(3) (Nov. 1999), pp. 205-217. 
13 For the original presentation of AIDS see Angus Deaton and J. Muellbauer, “An 
Almost Ideal Demand System,” 70 Am. Econ. Rev. 312 (1980).  
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of the ith brand, si, as a percent of total market revenues is a function of the natural 
logarithms of the prices, pi, of all of the brands in the relevant market: 
  s1 = a1 + b11 ln(p1) + b12 ln(p2) + b13 ln(p3) 
  s2 = a2 + b21 ln(p1) + b22 ln(p2) + b23 ln(p3) 
  s3 = a3 + b31 ln(p1) + b32 ln(p2) + b33 ln(p3) 
The coefficients bij (for i, j = 1,2,3) must be determined to use this system to simulate 
the effects of a merger.
15  As shown in the Appendix (Section 3, Equations (A4) and 
(A5)), the b’s underlie the own-price and cross-price elasticities.  The three “own-
coefficients” b11, b22, and b33 specify the effect of each brand’s own price on its share.  
These coefficients should have negative signs, since an increase in a brand’s price 
should (all other prices held constant) reduce its share; indeed, these coefficients are 
closely related to and have the same signs as the own-price elasticities.  The six other 
bij’s specify the effects of the prices of other brands on each brand’s share.  For 
example, b12 specifies the effect of an increase in the price of brand 2 on share 1, 
while b13 describes the effect of an increased price of brand 3 on brand 1’s share.  
These “cross-effect” coefficients are expected to be positive (assuming the three 
brands are substitutes), since these terms are related to and have the same signs as the 
cross-price elasticities.
16 
When we use this AIDS (or PCAIDS) model to simulate a merger, we wish to 
predict changes in the share of each brand resulting from the transaction.  These 
                                                                                                                                           
14 Calibrated-demand models based on other types of demand systems also require 
comparably strong structural assumptions.   
15 In this presentation we have suppressed the aggregate expenditure terms from the 
original Deaton and Muellbauer specification.  This “homotheticity” assumption is 
reasonable to the extent that changes in industry expenditure have no significant 
effects on share.  Since we are concerned only with changes created by the merger, 
the ai intercepts drop out in the analysis that follows.   
16 The market shares predicted by AIDS are required to sum to 100% -- the adding-up 
property.  We also impose homogeneity, the assumption that equal proportional 
changes in all prices have no effect on market share (e.g., if all prices went up by 10 
percent, the market shares for the various brands should not change).  As explained 
in the Appendix, adding-up and homogeneity effectively reduce the number of 
brands to be analyzed in the AIDS model from N to N–1.  
      9 
changes (obtained formally by differentiating each equation totally) are given by the 
following: 
ds1 = b11(dp1/p1) + b12(dp2/p2) + b13(dp3/p3) 
ds2 = b21(dp1/p1) + b22(dp2/p2) + b23(dp3/p3)  (1) 
ds3 = b31(dp1/p1) + b32(dp2/p2) + b33(dp3/p3) 
We can see from (1) that there is a linear relationship between the change in each 
brand’s market share (ds) and the percentage changes in the three prices (dp/p), where 
the b’s provide the weights.
17  Note, for example, that an increase in p1 leads to a 
decrease in  s1 (since dp1/p1 is positive and the weight b11 is negative), while an 
increase in p2 leads to an increase in s1 (since b12 is positive). 
B.  Econometric Estimation of Demand for Simulation Models 
The simple 3 -brand example also allows us to illustrate the difficulty in 
estimating elasticities.  In the example, a model with 3 brands has 9 b parameters: 3 
own coefficients and 6 cross-effect coefficients, which correspond to 3 own 
elasticities and 6 cross- elasticities.  More generally, a market with “n” brands gives 
rise to a total of  n
2 elasticities:  n own-price elasticities and  n(n–1) cross-price 
elasticities.  In the AIDS context,  n
2  bij coefficients generate these elasticities.
18  
While nine coefficients (n=3) may be easily tractable in this simple example, merger 
analysis can involve many more brands and parameters.  In the ready-to-eat cereal 
industry, for example, there are approximately 200 brands.  As a result, a complete 
cereal model could involve 40,000 elasticities!  To estimate the parameters of a 
demand model with many brands, it is necessary either to have a large data set, or to 
impose assumptions that reduce the number of independent parameters to be 
estimated.
19   
                                                 
17 The price changes will in general also affect the total size of the market (see the 
Appendix, section 1). 
18  Other demand models will also require a similar number of estimated coefficients. 
19 In addition to imposing adding-up and homogeneity, the number of parameters can 
also be reduced significantly by specifying a demand model that results from a 
multi-level decisionmaking process.  For an evaluation of this approach, see Daniel 
L. Rubinfeld, “Market Definition with Differentiated Products:  The Post/Nabisco 
Cereal Merger,” 68 Antitrust L. J. 163 (2000) at 173-176.  
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Econometric estimation using supermarket scanner data is sometimes thought 
to be the only practical way to determine demand parameters for large simulation 
models (AIDS-based or otherwise).  When available, these data can indeed be quite 
valuable.  For example, they often track detailed price variations across many cities or 
market areas on a weekly or monthly basis, and provide important information 
concerning trade promotion, couponing, and other marketing practices.  Nevertheless, 
there are important limitations that can handicap many applications.   
First, scanner data are typically available only for brands sold in supermarkets 
and the largest drug stores and mass merchandisers.  Unless supplemented by 
separate audits, retail sales data in smaller outlets are typically not available.  
Moreover, sales of many consumer goods, and nearly all intermediate goods, are not 
tracked by scanner data.  Second, the scanner data describe the retail prices  of 
consumer goods, whereas many mergers occur at the production or wholesale level.  
To use scanner data in such cases one must incorporate a set of assumptions about 
mark-ups and margins that link wholesale and retail prices.  Third, scanner data 
generally must be analyzed with complex econometric procedures that can sometimes 
be open to criticism.  For example, econometric issues involving model identification 
and estimation must be overcome before demand effects can be distinguished from 
supply effects.  Finally, despite one’s best efforts, econometric estimation may yield 
results at odds with common sense and intuition.  With many parameters to be 
estimated, it is frequently the case that at least some of the empirically estimated 
cross-price elasticities suffer from low levels of statistical significance, implausible 
magnitudes, and/or wrong algebraic signs.  
C.  PCAIDS: Proportionality-Calibrated AIDS 
Calibrated-demand simulation models offer an alternative to models that rely 
on econometric estimation of demand.  Because they reduce the number of required 
demand parameters, these models are especially valuable when there are data 
limitations or estimation problems, or when a rapid and less costly analysis is  
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required.
20  We offer Proportionality-Calibrated AIDS, i.e., PCAIDS, as a calibrated-
demand model that provides analytical flexibility while retaining many of the 
desirable properties of AIDS.  
PCAIDS requires neither scanner data, nor data on pre-merger prices.  It 
requires information only on market shares, the industry price elasticity, and the price 
elasticity for one brand in the market.  The logic of PCAIDS is simple.  The share lost 
as a result of a price increase is allocated to the other firms in the relevant market in 
proportion to their respective shares.  In effect, the market shares define probabilities 
of making incremental sales for each of the competitors.
21   
We believe that the proportionality assumption is practical and often 
reasonable when data are limited.
22  With proportionality and PCAIDS, one can take 
a “quick look” at the likely price effects of a merger; these results are likely to be 
reliable when applied to markets with limited product differentiation, or when the 
merger brands are not unusually close (or distant) in terms of their attributes and 
substitutability.  In this sense, proportionality reflects the analytical framework in the 
Merger Guidelines, which suggest that market share sometimes may be used to 
measure the relative appeal of the merging firms’ products as first and second choices 
for consumers.
23  Moreover, as we discuss below, PCAIDS can be extended to 
situations where extensive product differentiation makes proportionality suspect.  
                                                 
20 See Baker and Rubinfeld, note 1 supra, for a survey of a variety of approaches to 
the calibration of demand systems, including auction models and conjoint survey 
methods. 
21 This approach has long been used in other settings involving economics and law 
when data are limited.  For example, in  State Industries v. Mor-Flo, one of the 
leading decisions in the patent damages area, the assumption is that the patent 
holder suffers lost sales equal to its market share applied to the infringer’s sales (the 
remaining infringing sales would have been made by the other firms in the market 
in proportion to their respective shares).  For a recent analysis of this decision see 
Roy J. Epstein, “State Industries and Economics: Rethinking Patent Infringement 
Damages,” Fed. Cir. B. J. 9(3) (2000), pp. 367–381.   
22 Earlier discussions of proportionality in the context of merger analysis include 
Robert D. Willig, “Merger Analysis, Industrial Organization Theory, and Merger 
Guidelines,”  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity: Microeconomics 1991, ed. 
M. Baily and C. Winston, Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, pp. 299–305, 
and Shapiro, note 4 supra.  
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Indeed, PCAIDS can be used as an approximation of the AIDS model, with a 
structure that ensures proper signs and consistent magnitudes for the elasticities.
24  
Another potential advantage compared to other simulation methods is that PCAIDS 
can be implemented on a conventional spreadsheet without additional specialized 
software.  In summary, PCAIDS is a general method for calibrating AIDS demand 
with minimal data, and for which proportionality is a useful starting point. 
The simplifications that flow from the proportionality assumption of PCAIDS 
can be illustrated in a simple example.  The three equations in (1) above show that a 
change in the price of the first brand, p1, affects the market shares of all three brands.  
Recall that the own-effect of the price of brand 1 on the share of brand 1 is b11.  The 
cross-effects of p1 on the shares of brands 2 and 3 are given by b21 and b31.  With 
proportionality, sales are diverted to brands 2 and 3 in proportion to the market shares 
of the two brands.  For example, if brand 2 has a share of 40% and brand 3 a share of 
20%, an increase in the price of brand 1 will increase the share of brand 2 by twice as 
much as it increases the share of brand 3.  Formally, the proportionality assumptions 
implies that the cross-effects associated with p1 can be expressed in terms of b11 and 
the observed shares; b21 is equal to –s2/(s2+s3)b11 and b31 equals –s3/(s2+s3)b11.
25  The 
same relationships between own and cross effects hold for other prices; for example, 
b12 equals –s1/(s1+s3)b22. 
The proportionality assumption reduces the number of unknown  b’s in (1) 
from 9 to 3.  We only need to know the 3 own-effect coefficients (and market shares) 
to calculate the remaining 6 cross-effect coefficients.  More generally, the 
proportionality assumption posits a direct relationship between all cross-effects 
                                                                                                                                           
23 See Horizontal Merger Guidelines at ¶2.211. 
24 Our discussion of PCAIDS focuses on implementation with aggregate market share 
information.  However, the method is also applicable as a set of restrictions that 
could be imposed when estimating standard AIDS with scanner data.  We show in 
the Appendix that PCAIDS and its extensions to non-proportionality satisfy Slutsky 
symmetry, an important theoretical property for demand systems. 
25 The minus sign is necessary because b11 is negative (it is associated with the own-
effect).  It is easy to verify that the sum of the cross-effects in this case equals –b11, 
which confirms that adding-up is satisfied.  
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associated with a particular price change and the corresponding own-effect.
26  The 
implication is that the only unknowns in the model are the n own-effect coefficients. 
The assumption that the predicted market shares sum to 100% eliminates one 
additional unknown, so the number of unknown parameters is then reduced from n
2 to 
n–1, or from 40,000 to 199 in our cereal example. 
In fact, the proportionality assumption reduces the information requirement of 
PCAIDS even further.  It is not necessary to know all n (or even  n-1) own price 
effects or elasticities.  The PCAIDS model can be calibrated with only two 
independent pieces of information (in addition to the shares): the elasticity of demand 
for a single brand and the elasticity for the industry as a whole.  For example, only the 
industry elasticity and the own-price elasticity for brand 1 are needed as inputs in the 
calculation of the own-effect coefficient for brand 1, b11:
27   
  )) 1 ( 1 ( 1 11 1 11 + - + = e s e s b .  (2) 
In Equation (2), e11 is the own-price elasticity for brand 1 and e is the industry 
elasticity.  Then, as shown in Section 4.A. of the Appendix, proportionality implies 
that all remaining unknown own-effect coefficients can be determined as simple 

















=  .  (3) 
We have already seen that once the bii own effects have been calculated, the 
cross-price effects can then be calculated from the own-price effects and market 
shares.  This means that knowledge of the own-price elasticity of any one brand and 
the overall industry price elasticity is sufficient to obtain estimates of all relevant 
demand parameters of the PCAIDS model from the market share data.  This is true 
whether there are 3 or 200 brands.   
                                                 
26 Note that elasticities derived using the assumption of proportionality may be 
sensitive to the market definition.  If additional brands are thought to be in the 
market, and are therefore included in the model, the estimated price effects of the 
merger could change.   
27 More generally, the own-effect coefficient for any one brand can be determined 
from the industry elasticity and the own-price elasticity for that brand; the result is 
proven in the Appendix.  
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Elasticities can be calculated directly from the values for the b parameters, the 
market shares (si), and the industry elasticity (e), as follows (see Appendix equations 
(A4) and (A5) for details): 
Own-price elasticity for the ith brand: eii =  ) 1 ( 1 i
i
ii + + + - e s
s
b    (4) 
Cross-price elasticity of the ith brand with respect to the price of the jth brand:  
                     eij =   ) 1 ( j
i
ij + + e s
s
b
.  (5) 
Under the assumption that the magnitude of the industry elasticity e is smaller than 
any brand own-price elasticity, PCAIDS implies that the cross elasticities will be 
positive. Moreover, it can be shown that all pre-transaction cross-elasticities 
corresponding to a given price change are equal, i.e., eij = ekj for all brands i, j, and k.  
This equality is a consequence of the assumption of proportionality.
28   
All the information required to calibrate PCAIDS should be available.  Market 
shares typically are known with reasonable accuracy.  It should be feasible to infer 
the own-price elasticity for at least one brand sold by the merging parties from 
marketing studies in the party’s documents (including surveys and focus groups), 
from econometric analyses, or from accounting data.
29  The industry elasticity 
typically is considerably smaller than the price elasticity of any one brand, since 
brand substitution is easier than industry substitution.
30  Absent independent 
information about the magnitude of that elasticity, we suggest an industry elasticity of 
                                                 
28 The assumption of proportionality is equivalent to the assumption of “Irrelevance 
of Independent Alternatives” (IIA) that underlies the logit model.  Unlike the logit 
model, however, the PCAIDS post-merger elasticities are not constrained by IIA.   
29 For an extensive discussion of the range of empirical methods that can be used to 
obtain estimates of demand elasticities, see Baker and Rubinfeld, note 1 supra, 
Section 3. 
30 Suppose the prices of all cereals rose by 10 percent.  Since many consumers, 
particularly children, are likely to continue eating the similar quantities of cereal for 
breakfast (some, of course, will not and consumption of cereal for other purposes, 
such as snacks, may fall), ready-to-eat demand is not likely to be highly price 
sensitive.  On the other hand, a 10 percent increase for a single brand, such as corn 
flakes, with no change in competitors’ prices, will be more price sensitive, since it 
will likely result in substantial switching to other products within the cereal 
category.  
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–1 as a good starting point for a preliminary merger simulation.  If the market under 
study is a relevant antitrust market, the industry elasticity will be equal to or greater 
than 1 in magnitude.  As a result, this assumption will be conservative in its tendency 
to overpredict the price effects of mergers.
31   
To illustrate PCAIDS, reconsider the demand system in (1).  Assume that the 
shares for the 3 brands (each sold by a different firm) are 20%, 30%, and 50%, 
respectively.  Now, assume that there is a proposed merger between firms 1 and 2, the 
industry elasticity is –1, and the own-price elasticity for the first brand is –3.  The 
formulas for PCAIDS given above and in the Appendix allow calculation of all 
parameters of the demand system (1) and all elasticities as shown in Table 1 below. 
Table 1  
PCAIDS Coefficients and Elasticities 
  PCAIDS Coefficient with Respect to:    Elasticity with Respect to: 
Brand  p1  p2  p3  Brand  p1  p2  p3 
1  –0.400  0.150  0.250  1  –3.00  0.75  1.25 
2  0.150  –0.525  0.375  2  0.50  –2.75  1.25 
3  0.250  0.375  –0.625  3  0.50  0.75  –2.25 
 
The calculated own elasticities—the negative values on the diagonal of the 
right panel of the table—can be either larger or smaller than the elasticity for the 
brand used to calibrate the system.
32  Reading down each column of elasticities, the 
cross elasticities corresponding to a given price are equal as expected given 
proportionality.  PCAIDS simulation with these parameters predicts a unilateral post-
merger price increase (absent efficiencies) of 13.8% for Brand 1 and 10.8% for Brand 
2. 
                                                 
31 This follows from the rule of thumb for pricing by a monopolist.  See, for example, 
Daniel L . Rubinfeld and Robert S. Pindyck, Microeconomics, 5
th Edition (2000), 
Chapter 11. 
32 The PCAIDS coefficients satisfy adding-up and homogeneity and are symmetric, as 
required.   
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D.  Deviations from Proportionality — PCAIDS with Nests 
Proportionality will not always characterize the diversion of lost sales 
accurately when products are highly differentiated.
33  Fortunately, it is 
straightforward to modify PCAIDS to allow a more general analysis.  Products that 
are closer substitutes for each other than proportionality suggests may be placed 
together in “nests.”  The approach is analogous to using nests in a logit context, but 
we believe it is easier and more flexible to calibrate PCAIDS with a nest structure.   
To illustrate, return to the three-brand example discussed in the previous 
section.  In that example, brand 2’s market share of 30% and brand 3’s share of 50% 
implied that 37.5% (30/80) of the share lost by brand 1 when its price increased 
would be diverted to brand 2 and 62.5% (50/80) would be diverted to brand 3.  This 
effect can be characterized using an odds ratio.  Here, the odds ratio between brand 2 
and brand 3 is 0.6 (0.375/0.625).  That is, under proportionality, brand 2 is only 60% 
as likely to be chosen by consumers leaving brand 1 as brand 3.  Now suppose instead 
that brand 2 is relatively “farther” from brand 1 in the sense that that fewer consumers 
would choose brand 2 in response to an increase in p1 than would be predicted by 
proportionality.  For example, brand 2 may only be “half as desirable” a substitute as 
brand 3 and the appropriate odds ratio really only 0.3.  It is  straightforward to 
calculate in this case that the share diversion to brand 2 becomes 23.1% and the 
diversion to brand 3 increases to 76.9% (an odds ratio of 0.3=.231/.769).  As 
expected, fewer consumers leaving brand 1 would choose brand 2.  
We generalize PCAIDS to cover such situations by constructing separate 
“nests” of brands.  Diversion among brands within each nest is characterized by 
proportionality.  Share diverted to a brand in a different nest deviates from 
proportionality in the following sense: the odds ratio is equal to the odds ratio under 
                                                 
33 Cf. Horizontal Merger Guidelines at ¶2.211: “The market shares of the merging 
firms’ products may understate the competitive effect of concern, when, for 
example, the products of the merging firms are relatively more similar in their 
various attributes to one another than to other products in the relevant market.  On 
the other hand, the market shares alone may overstate the competitive effects of 
concern when, for example, the relevant products are less similar in their attributes 
to one another than to other products in the relevant market.”  
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proportionality, multiplied by an appropriate scaling factor ranging from 0 to 1.  The 
result is that brands within a nest are closer substitutes than brands outside the nest.  
PCAIDS with nests allows a more flexible pattern of cross elasticities, as the model is 
no longer fully constrained by the proportionality assumption.    
Continuing with the example, we capture the effect of brand 2 being a less 
close substitute for brand 1 than indicated by market shares by placing brand 2 in a 
separate nest with a scaling or odds ratio factor of 0.5.  We then use formulas in the 
Appendix to recalculate the b coefficients and resulting elasticities with this nesting 
assumption.





PCAIDS Elasticities with Nests 
   
Non-Nested Demand 
  Separate Brand 2 Nest, 
(Odds Ratio Factor = 0.5) 
  Elasticity with Respect to:    Elasticity with Respect to: 
Brand  p1  p2  p3  Brand  p1  p2  p3 
1  –3.00  0.75  1.25  1  –3.00  0.46  1.54 
2  0.50  –2.75  1.25  2  0.31  –2.08  0.77 
3  0.50  0.75  –2.25  3  0.62  0.46  –2.08 
 
The nest parameter rescales the cross elasticities in the right-hand panel; the 
cross elasticities measuring the responses of brands 2 and 3 to the price of brand 1, 
and those measuring the responses of brands 1 and 2 to the price of brand 3 are no 
longer equal.  (The cross elasticities measuring the responses of brand 1 and brand 3 
to the price of brand 2 remain equal, but at lower values, because brands 1 and 3 are 
in the same nest while brand 2 is outside.)  With nesting, brand 2 becomes a poorer 
                                                                                                                                           
 
34 It would be incorrect to scale the non-nested elasticities in the left-hand panel 
directly.  Nests affect the impact of adding-up, homogeneity, and symmetry and the 
appropriate calculation takes account of these constraints to generate economically 
consistent elasticities.   
35 The calculations continue to assume an own-price elasticity of –3 for Brand 1 and 
an industry elasticity of –1.  
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substitute for brands 1 and 3 (as indicated by the smaller cross elasticities of brand 2 
to the prices of brands 1 and 3 and of brands 1 and 3 to the price of brand 2), while 
brands 1 and 3 become better substitutes for each other (as indicated by the larger 
cross elasticities of brands 1 to the price of brand 3 and of brand 1 to changes in the 
price of brand 3).  
Simulation of a merger of brand 1 and brand 2 using this nested PCAIDS 
model predicts a unilateral price increase (without efficiencies) of 10.1% for both 
brand 1 and brand 2, compared to the original increases of 13.8% and 10.8% without 
nests.  The unilateral effects are smaller because the merging brands are less close 
substitutes for each other. 
What remains is the difficult question of when proportionality is 
inappropriate, making nests necessary for accurate merger simulations.  To our 
knowledge there has been very little empirical testing of this question.
36  We note, 
however, that if PCAIDS introduces the possibility of biased values for the  b 
coefficients, it may still provide an economically useful approximation.
37  
Fortunately, PCAIDS makes it easy to detect whether nesting is likely have 
economically meaningful effects through a sensitivity analysis of the odds ratio 
factors.  We suspect that most simulations will justify very few nests, since 
simulation results appear to be robust to modest departures from proportionality.  We 
also believe that a coarse grid (e.g., 0.75, 0.50, and 0.25) covering a range of odds 
ratio factors is adequate to assess sensitivity. 
                                                 
36 A statistical test procedure is described in Jerry A. Hausman and Daniel McFadden, 
“Specification Tests for the Multinomial Logit Model,” Econometrica (1984).  One 
recent AIDS analysis of a grocery item using scanner data indicates that 
proportionality is reasonable but it does not formally test the hypothesis.  See David 
A. Weiskopf, “Assessment of the Relationship between Various Types of 
Estimation Bias and the Simulated Economic Impact of Certain Anti-Competitive 
Scenarios,” Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Vanderbilt University, Department of 
Economics (1999) at 55 and Table B2. 
37 In econometric terms, coefficients estimated with the PCAIDS restrictions could 
have lower mean square error, i.e., the reduced variance of the estimates may more 
than balance any bias that is introduced.   See, for example, Robert S. Pindyck and 
Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Econometric Models and Economic Forecasts (1998) at 29–
32.  
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E.  PCAIDS and Other Calibrated-Demand Simulation Models 
The PCAIDS model shares some characteristics with models based on logit 
demand structures that have been used to simulate mergers.  Both assume 
proportionality (the logit model makes a comparable assumption of "independence of 
irrelevant alternatives"), yield positive cross elasticities, and can be calibrated with 
only two parameters.  We prefer PCAIDS to logit, however, for several reasons.  
First, PCAIDS does not require pre-merger price data.  There will doubtless be 
occasions where prices are either not available for all firms in the market or are not 
measured accurately.  Second, one can depart from proportionality in the PCAIDS 
framework using nested demands.  Logit models can be generalized with nests as 
well, but we believe that logit is more difficult to calibrate econometrically and the 
additional nesting parameters are less intuitive.
38  Third, we prefer PCAIDS because 
it has mathematical “curvature” that approximates that of the standard AIDS model.
39  
We suggest that the “curvature” of AIDS models is likely to fit data better than that of 
logit demand, although we recognize  that this opinion invites further empirical 
research.
40  In essence, we view PCAIDS as a desirable mix of the best features of 
both logit (few parameters, correct signs) and AIDS (non-reliance on independence of 
irrelevant alternatives, ability to fit the data, curvature).
41 
Our approach is similar in spirit to one suggested by Carl Shapiro.
42  Shapiro 
offers a rule-of-thumb formula for calculating the predicted prices of the post-merger 
                                                 
38 For a discussion of estimation problems with nested logits, see Gregory J. Werden 
and Luke M. Froeb, “The Effects of Mergers in Differentiated Products Industries: 
Logit Demand and Merger Policy,” J. of Law, Econ., and Org. 10(2) (1994) at 420. 
39 For an analysis of curvature of alternative demand models see Crooke, Froeb, 
Tschantz, and Werden, note 12 supra.  
40 We are aware of very few studies that directly compare AIDS and logit using real-
world data.  A recent article that uses grocery scanner data on white pan bread sales 
indicates AIDS fit the data significantly better than logit.  See Atanu Saha and Peter 
Simon, “Predicting the Price Effect of Mergers with Polynomial Logit Demand,” 
Int. J. of the Econ. of Bus. 7 (2)(2000) at 154.   
41 The informative discussion at www.antitrust.org/economics/simulation concludes 
that “much progress has been made using the linear and nested logit demand 
specifications….However, more progress can be made, by simulating the effects of 
mergers within the context of more flexible functional forms, like the AIDS model.” 
42 Shapiro, note 4 supra and also www.usdoj/atr/public/speeches/shapiro.spc.  
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firm, assuming that the merger involves two firms and two symmetric merging 
brands.  As inputs, he requires markups (or equivalently gross margins) and diversion 
ratios.  Shapiro's diversion ratio-symmetry assumptions in his two-brand example are 
similar to our proportionality assumption.  However, his approach differs from ours in 
a number of ways.  First, in much of the paper Shapiro assumes that demand 
elasticities are constant, an assumption that can create simulation difficulties because 
(a) such models sometime fail to converge; (b) the price increases resulting from a 
merger tend to be overstated; (c) non-merging firms do not raise prices in response to 
unilateral increases by the merged entity.  Second, his approach does not readily 
generalize to multi-brand firms.  Finally, Shapiro does not discuss possible extensions 
when the proportionality assumption does not appear to be reasonable.   
IV.  USING PCAIDS 
This section offers a number of examples of applications of PCAIDS that are 
intended to make some of the principles discussed above more concrete.  Our goal is 
to demonstrate that PCAIDS can provide reasonable estimates of the simulated 
effects of mergers at relatively low cost and with some transparency.  The examples 
demonstrate the calibration of the PCAIDS demand model using shares and 
elasticities, the incorporation of efficiencies, sensitivity analyses using nests, and 
divestiture. The examples utilize available data on toilet paper, baby food, and white 
pan bread.  
A.  The Kimberly-Clark/Scott Merger Revisited 
We first use PCAIDS to re-examine the acquisition of Scott by Kimberly-
Clark.  A PCAIDS analysis of this 1992 merger may be compared to an earlier 
published simulation analysis by Hausman and Leonard that used supermarket 
scanner data to estimate econometrically a standard AIDS model.
43 
There were eight toilet paper brands pre-merger with national shares as shown 
in Table 3: 
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Table 3 
Toilet Paper Market Shares 
Brand  Share (%) 
ScotTissue  30.9 
Cottonelle  7.5 
Kleenex  6.7 
Charmin  12.4 
Northern  8.8 
Angel  16.7 
Private Label  7.6 
Other  9.4 
                 Total  100.0 
 
Scott produced both ScotTissue and Cottonelle.  Kimberly-Clark produced only 
Kleenex.  We calibrate PCAIDS using a price elasticity for Scott of –2.94 reported by 
Hausman and Leonard and an estimate of –1.17 for industry elasticity inferred from 
their article.   
Table 4 compares PCAIDS price elasticities calculated using these parameters 
to the elasticities estimated econometrically by Hausman-Leonard. 
                                                                                                                                           
43 Jerry A. Hausman and Gregory K. Leonard, “Economic Analysis of Differentiated 
Products Mergers Using Real World Data,” 5 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 321 (1997).  
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Table 4 
PCAIDS and Hausman-Leonard Elasticities 
  Own-Price Elasticity  Cross-Price Elasticity 








ScotTissue  –2.9  –2.9  0.36  0.24 
Cottonelle  –3.2  –4.5  0.14  0.22 
Kleenex  –3.1  –3.4  0.16  0.13 
Charmin  –2.6  –2.7  0.66  0.35 
Northern  –3.0  –4.2  0.26  0.41 
Angel  –3.1  –4.1  0.19  0.26 
Private 
Label 
–3.1  –2.0  0.16  0.09 
Other  –3.1  –2.0  0.20  0.27 
Average  –3.0  –3.2  0.27  0.24 
 
The two methods yield similar results brand by brand, and on average there 
appears to be relatively little difference.
44  We take this as evidence that the 
proportionality assumption of PCAIDS is reasonably consistent with the toilet paper 
data.  Moreover, differences between the elasticities yielded by the two methods may 
not be statistically significant.  Hausman-Leonard report low precision for many of 
the estimated cross-price elasticities between the merging products in their model.  
For example, they report a Kleenex/Scott cross-price elasticity of 0.061 with a 
standard error of 0.066; this means that their estimated cross-elasticity is within two 
standard errors of our calibrated PCAIDS value of 0.16.  Uncertainty about the true 
value of this cross-elasticity is particularly crucial to the merger simulation analysis 
since the magnitude of this cross-elasticity has a large effect on the price increases 
predicted from the merger.  
                                                 
44 Each Hausman-Leonard cross-price elasticity in the table is calculated as the 
average of the cross-price elasticities with respect to the price of the brand given in 
the left-most column.  The Hausman-Leonard study reported several negative cross 
elasticities (for non-merging goods) that we found difficult to interpret.  The 
average values reported in the table exclude any negative cross-price elasticities.    
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The two simulation methods (taking into account the efficiencies assumed by 
Hausman-Leonard) yield predicted price changes for the merging firms as shown in 
Table 5:  
Table 5 
Simulated Unilateral Effects – Toilet Paper 
  Price Change  (%) 




ScotTissue  –0.3  –1.1 
Cottonelle    0.7    0.5 
Kleenex    4.3    0.2 
 
The two models predict similar price changes for ScotTissue and Cottonelle.  
There is a greater difference between the price changes predicted by the two models 
for Kleenex, although even this difference may not be statistically significant.  As a 
sensitivity test, we introduced a nest structure that lowered the PCAIDS 
Kleenex/Scott cross elasticity to 0.061 and left the other cross elasticities in the model 
essentially unchanged.  The price increase for Kleenex predicted by this nested 
PCAIDS model fell to 1.7 percent.  This experiment suggests that increasing the same 
cross-price elasticity by two standard errors in the Hausman-Leonard simulation 
would produce a Kleenex price change much closer to the PCAIDS result. 
B.  Efficiencies in a Baby Food Acquisition 
The recently terminated effort by Heinz to acquire the Beech-Nut baby food 
assets raises many interesting questions about the role of efficiencies in merger 
analysis.  We were not involved in that transaction, but it is our understanding that the 
litigation centered on coordinated effects.  Indeed, we cannot ascertain from the 
published opinion whether either side presented testimony that relied on a merger 
simulation analysis of unilateral effects.
45  Nevertheless, we will use this proposed 
                                                 
45 See FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co. and Milnot Holding Corporation, U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the D.C. Circuit, April 27, 2001.  
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merger as an example of how PCAIDS might be applied to evaluate unilateral effects 
issues.  
According to the Court, there is a national relevant market for baby food in 
jars.  The industry is concentrated, with three major firms and a small fringe (which 
we represent as a composite “private label” firm
46).  The market shares are given in 
Table 6: 
Table 6 
Baby-Food Market Shares 
Brand  Share (%) 
Heinz  17.4 
Beech-Nut  15.4 
Gerber  65.0 
Private Label  2.2 
   
                 Total  100.0 
 
The pre-transaction HHI was 4,770, with a delta of 536, well above the safeharbor 
limits in the Merger Guidelines.  Market shares and the HHI alone, however, do not 
provide sufficient information to analyze the potential magnitudes of a unilateral 
price increase or the mitigating effect of efficiencies. 
We do not analyze individual brands, but instead treat each firm as if it 
produced a single aggregate.  We also do not distinguish competition at the retail 
level (for customers) from c ompetition at the wholesale level (for shelf space).  
Because the written opinion does not offer specific price elasticities, we have 
assumed an industry elasticity of –1.0 and we have estimated a price elasticity for 
Heinz of –2.60 from financial information.
47   
                                                 
46 The use of composite goods or firms is common in merger simulation because, 
when appropriate, it greatly diminishes the number of parameters in the model and 
simplifies the analysis. 
47 The elasticity was calculated as negative of ratio of sales ($9,407,949) to gross 
profit ($3,619,424).  At the profit-maximizing price for a firm, the negative of its 
markup of price over cost as a proportion of price equals the inverse of its elasticity.  
See H.J. Heinz Company Form 10-K for fiscal year ended May 3, 2000, 
Consolidated Statements of Income, available at www.edgar-online.com.    
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  We consider three alternative simulations.  First, we model the four firms as 
belonging in a single nest.  Proportionality implies that most of the share lost by 
Heinz due to a price increase would be diverted to Gerber instead of Beech-Nut.  The 
ratio of the Gerber to the Beech-Nut market share equals 65/15.4.  This yields an odds 
ratio of 4.22, which indicates that consumers leaving Heinz would be more than four 
times as likely to shift to Gerber as to Beech-Nut.  For the second simulation, we put 
Heinz and Beech-Nut in a separate nest from Gerber and private label, with an odds 
ratio factor of 0.5.  This nest structure represents the hypothesis that one group of 
consumers strongly prefers Gerber to Heinz and Beech-Nut.  In this scenario the 
Gerber Beech-Nut odds ratio falls by half to 2.11, indicating that Gerber becomes a 
poorer substitute (now only about twice as many consumers would choose Gerber).  
For the third simulation, we put Heinz and private label in a separate nest from 
Gerber and Beech-Nut, also with an odds ratio factor of 0.5.  This scenario tests the 
implication of treating Gerber and Beech-Nut as closer substitutes because they are 
both premium priced brands.  Since proportionality holds within a nest, the odds ratio 
would revert to 4.22 (the ratio of their market shares).   
The simulated unilateral effects for each of these scenarios, in the absence of 
any efficiencies, are given in Table 7: 
Table 7 
Simulated Unilateral Effects – Baby Food 
  Simulated Price Change 
Firm  No Nests  Heinz Beech-Nut Nest  Beech-Nut Gerber Nest 
Heinz  6.2%  12.3%  3.9% 
Beech-Nut  6.8%  13.3%  3.4% 
 
These results illustrate the importance of the nesting assumption for the magnitude of 
the price increases.  Predicted price increases are largest when the merging firms are 
in the same nest (which implies consumers view them as closer substitutes for each 
other than market shares alone suggest), and smallest when the merging firms are in 
separate nests (which implies consumers view then as less close substitutes for each 
other than market shares alone suggest).  
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PCAIDS can also be used to provide estimates of the efficiencies that would 
fully offset the predicted price effects.  For the no-nest case, we calculate that 
reductions in marginal costs of approximately 8% f or both Heinz and Beech-Nut 
would be required.  If Heinz and Beech-Nut are closer substitutes and in the same 
nest, reductions in marginal costs of approximately 16% for each firm are necessary 
to offset the predicted price increase  
The Court notes that the merging parties claimed expected efficiencies of 
22.3% for Beech-Nut.
48  It is not clear to what extent the claimed cost-reductions for 
Beech-Nut would translate into merger-specific efficiencies for the merged entity.
49  
However, our analysis in this hypothetical suggests that evidence on efficiencies 
would have been crucial to any argument that unilateral effects of the merger on price 
were not likely to be significant.  
C.  Merger with Divestiture 
Some proposed transactions raise concerns about unilateral price effects that 
cannot be overcome by expected efficiencies or repositioning.  Divestiture may be an 
option to “fix” such a deal, and simulation analysis can help evaluate whether and 
which divestitures would eliminate competitive concerns.  We illustrate an analysis of 
divestiture using data from a recent study of a merger between two large white pan 
bread bakeries.
50  The pre-transaction market contained six firms with market shares 
as shown in Table 8:   
                                                 
48 FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co. and Milnot Holding  at Section. II.C.2. 
49 We understand (from personal communication) that Jonathan Baker testified (on 
behalf of Beech-Nut and Heinz) to an expcted 15% reduction in marginal cost for 
the gains passed-through to the Beech-Nut brand.  According to Baker, these gains 
would come from a price reduction; the gains to Heinz buyers would come from 
getting a brand that is 15% higher in quality (at the same price as their old brand 
according to the merging parties). 
50 See Saha and Simon, note 40 supra.  
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Table 8 
Market Shares – White Pan Bread 
Firm-Brand  Share (%) 
A-1  14.2 
A-2  8.05 
A-3  7.6 
B-1  8.8 
C-1  7.0 
D-1  7.6 
Grocery  31.5 
Other  15.2 
                 Total  100.0 
 
Firms A and B are the merging parties.  “Grocery” and “Other” are composites of 
smaller suppliers.  The pre-transaction HHI was 2,317 with a change of 524, values 
that could trigger detailed agency review. 
According to the study, the industry elasticity was –1.0.  We set the elasticity 
for B-1 to the study’s estimate of –1.34 to complete the PCAIDS calibration of the 
demand model.  Initially we assume proportionality.  Table 9 shows the unilateral 
price increases for the merged firm predicted by PCAIDS in the absence of 
efficiencies.  
Table 9 





A-1  10.0 
A-2  10.0 
A-3  10.0 
B-1  28.7 
 
The share-weighted average price increase for the brands in the merger is 
14.3%.  Further analysis shows that even if the merger yielded efficiencies that 
reduced the marginal costs of each brand by 10%, the PCAIDS simulation would 
predict a price increase of approximately 18% for B-1.  The share-weighted average  
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price increase for the merged firm with these efficiencies is 4.4%, which may still 
raise concerns.  We also experimented with nests, since A-3 was a premium priced 
brand and perhaps was less of a substitute for the lower priced B-4.  However, we did 
not find that plausible nest structures significantly affected the results.
51  Without the 
prospect of timely entry or of efficiencies greater than 10%, the transaction would 
certainly raise anticompetitive concerns.   
Divestiture by Firm A of one or more of its three brands is one possible 
strategy to restructure the deal.  The effect of divestiture on unilateral pricing 
behavior will depend both on what brand or brands are divested and what firm 
acquires those brands.  Simulation models can help analyze the effects on prices of 
specific divestitures.  We first simulated the merger assuming a sale of A -3 to the 
smallest firm, C.  For this merger and divestiture, assuming no efficiencies, the 
predicted share-weighed average price increase for the four brands originally sold by 
the merging firms is only 2.8%.  Even modest merger-related efficiencies would 
eliminate this average price increase.  Alternatively, we simulated the merger with 
divestiture of A-3 to a hypothetical new entrant and found a share-weighted average 
price increase of only 1.8% before efficiencies. 
  The evaluation of these simulated post-divestiture price effects also raises the 
issue of appropriate measurement of prices.  In our example, the range of price 
changes for the various brands is quite wide.  For example, if A-3 is divested to firm 
C its price is predicted to decrease by 11.0%, while A-1 and A-2 have predicted price 
increases of 1.3% and B -1 has a predicted price increase of 18.6%.  Divestiture 
reduces considerably the predicted price increases for brands the merged firm retains 
and results in a predicted price decrease rather than increase for A-3.  An important 
issue facing the merger authorities in this situation is whether a transaction should be 
judged by its effect on average prices in the relevant market, or by its separate effects 
on the prices for individual brands. 
                                                 
51 We even tried an extreme case of putting A-3 in a separate nest from all of the 
other brands in the market and setting the odds ratio factor to 0.01 to minimize the 
competitive overlap with B-1.   
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V.  ANALYZING PRODUCT REPOSITIONING AND ENTRY WITH 
PCAIDS  
The  Horizontal Merger Guidelines acknowledge entry and product 
repositioning as competitive responses to a merger with unilateral price increases.
52  
The Guidelines distinguish between “committed” entry, which requires significant 
sunk costs of entry and exit, and “uncommitted” entry, which  does not.
53  
Uncommitted entrants are capable of increasing output sufficiently quickly (e.g., by 
redeploying existing assets) that they are able to constrain the market pre-transaction.  
For this reason, the Guidelines focus on committed entry as truly new competition 
that may be generated by unilateral price increases.  For committed entry to be an 
effective competitive check according to the Merger Guidelines, it must occur within 
two years (timeliness), must be profitable at pre-transaction prices (likelihood), and 
“must be responsive to the localized sales opportunities that include the output 
reduction associated with the competitive effect of concern” (sufficiency).   
Merger simulation (which could be based on PCAIDS or other demand 
models) provides a prediction of the unilateral price increases that would occur absent 
entry or repositioning.  Associated with any such price increase will be a reduction in 
output.  The central question is whether repositioning or entry can increase output 
sufficiently to defeat the price increase.   
A complete analysis of entry and repositioning raises difficult modeling issues 
that go beyond the scope of this article.  It would require an assessment of sunk costs 
and minimum viable scale (the smallest scale at which its average cost is equal to the 
pre-transaction price) for committed entry, as well as a financial-accounting analysis 
to determine whether pre-transaction prices are adequate for long-run profitability.  
Nonetheless, we believe that PCAIDS can provide a useful framework in which to 
analyze under the conditions under which committed and uncommitted responses 
might be expected to constrain unilateral price increases.   
We use the following procedure to identify the amount of entry that should be 
sufficient to eliminate unilateral price increases.  For any brand sold by the merged 
                                                 
52 The Horizontal Merger Guidelines at footnote 23 indicates that the same analysis 
applies to both cases.  
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firm, the post-merger revenue can be defined in terms of the pre-merger revenue and 
the unilateral percent change in price (d
*) and percent change in quantity (denoted a) 
for the brand.  Since the shares and industry elasticity are known, and the merger 
simulation yields the unilateral price changes, it is possible to solve for the percentage 





pre(1–a), it can be 
shown that (see Section 4.D. of the Appendix for details) 
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- = a .  (7) 
The predicted output reduction therefore depends on two price effects: the unilateral 
brand price increase and the average price change (dP/P) for the market as a whole. 
The m agnitude of the reduction in output in terms of the pre-transaction 
revenue market share for the brand is  as
pre.  If the entrant’s sales were a close 
substitute for the restricted output, then we could expect sales at this share level for 
the new brand to be sufficient to constrain the merged firm at pre-transaction prices.
54  
The rationale is that the sales opportunities of the entrant would effectively restore the 
restricted output to the market, implying a return to the pre-transaction prices.
55  This 
analysis can be applied to solve for the value of a for each brand sold by the merged 
firm for which unilateral price increases are a concern.  The total required entry 
would then be the sum of the shares from the individual a factors.   
The merger simulation may also indicate that other firms in the market would 
raise price and restrict output, generating additional sales opportunities.  It may be 
appropriate to require additional entry to constrain these price increases as well, in 
order to make sure that the entrant is not diverted from pursuing the opportunities 
from the merged firm’s output restrictions.   
                                                                                                                                           
53 See Horizontal Merger Guidelines at ¶1.0 and ¶3.0. 
54 Normally, we would expect the entrant to offer a close substitute, since entry is 
intended to take advantage of the sales opportunities resulting from unilateral price 
increases. 
55 We implicitly assume that the combined sales of the entrant and the brand produced 
by the merged firm equal the pre-transaction level.  That is, the entrant does not 
merely “cannibalize” sales from the incumbent.  
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This analysis can, in principle, be applied to both uncommitted and committed 
repositioning.  In the uncommitted case, sunk repositioning costs are assumed to be 
zero.  For committed repositioning, it is necessary to carry out additional analyses to 
determine required sunk costs and minimum viable scale.  As the Merger Guidelines 
point out, entry is unlikely if the minimum viable scale is larger than the sales 
opportunities available to entrants.  In addition, the profits on the sales opportunities 
at pre-transaction prices must be sufficient to justify the sunk costs.   
To illustrate some of the issues involved in an analysis of entry, we consider a 
hypothetical transaction involving ready-to-eat (“RTE”) cereals.
56  RTE cereal 
products are highly differentiated along several dimensions (e.g., sweetness, texture, 
grains, vitamin and fiber content, color and packaging).  Because this example uses 
aggregated data and relies on other simplifying assumptions for purposes of 
illustration, we do not identify individual companies or their product lines.  In our 
example there are six firms: firms A, B, C, and D are “majors,” firm E is a private 
label composite, and firm F is another composite firm that represents an aggregation 
of other, smaller brands.  Firms C and D each sell two brands.  We use PCAIDS to 
analyze a hypothetical merger between firms A and B. 
We account for the fact that the characteristics of firms’ brands affect 
consumers’ substitution patterns by placing the brands of the six firms in two nests, 
based on whether each firm’s brands appeal primarily to adults or to children.  (Each 
nest in the example could contain multiple brands.)  The pre-merger shares and nests 
are given in Table 10.
57 
                                                 
56 We wish to thank Kraft Foods for providing us with the breakfast cereal data. 
57 We use the notions of Kids and Adult nests for illustrative purposes only.  We 
believe, nevertheless, that the relevant market for antitrust purposes is all ready-to-
eat cereals.  See State of New York v. Kraft General Foods, Inc., 926 F. Supp. 321, 
356 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).  
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Table 10 
Pre-Merger Market Shares 
Firm-Brand  Share (%)  Nest 
A-1  13.0  Kids 
B-1  4.2  Adult 
C-1  26.5  Kids 
C-2  8.8  Adult 
D-1  21.8  Kids 
D-2  5.4  Adult 
Private Label  6.0  Kids 
Other  14.2  Kids 
                 Total  100.0   
 
Proportionality holds within each nest.  We assume a scaling factor of 50% for 
share diversion across nests.  That is, the share diverted from a Kids brand to an Adult 
brand (and vice versa) is only half as large as predicted by their market shares.  This 
structure introduces a simple, but flexible alternative to strict proportionality (with a 
factor of 100%).   
To complete the data requirements for the simulation, we assume an industry 
price elasticity of –1.0 and an own-price elasticity of –1.60 for A.
58  We also assume 
that a merger between A and B will generate efficiencies that lower incremental costs 
for each firm by 2%.   
Taking into account the efficiencies (but not repositioning or entry), the 
PCAIDS simulation predicts that the merger will result in no change in A’s prices.  
However, the predicted price increase for B is 4.9% and its share falls to 4.1%.  This 
post-merger price increase could raise competitive concerns, but it might also induce 
other firms to enter de novo or to redesign and reposition their products to compete 
more directly with B.   
We calculate the required entry to constrain B as follows.  The value for a 
obtained from Equation (7) is 0.065.  As a result, the value of the restricted output is 
                                                 
58 The own-price elasticity for the example is calculated as the ratio of gross profits to 
sales from aggregate financial statements for A.  A more refined estimate would 
require information on sales and costs by product line.  
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0.27 percentage points of market share (0.065 multiplied by the pre-transaction share 
of 4.2%).  If an entrant could achieve this share with a new brand that is a close 
substitute for B then the unilateral price increase can be prevented. 
The small amount of required entry in the example is not surprising, since B is 
a relatively small firm.  (The amount of restricted output must be less than the size of 
B).  This highlights the potential importance of the analysis of minimum viable scale, 
because entry on such a limited basis may not be economic.  In the RTE cereal 
industry, one possibility for low-cost entry might be repositioning of existing brands 
(or capacity) from the Kids segment to the Adult segment. 
Ultimately it is a matter of judgment as to whether an entrant would be 
capable of achieving the requisite share to make raising prices unprofitable for the 
merging firm.  Additional analysis would also be necessary to determine whether the 
entrant would achieve minimum viable scale and be profitable at pre-merger prices.  
Nevertheless, we are optimistic that the approaches just described can provide a 
feasible and useful framework to evaluate the range of issues raised when entry and 
repositioning are discussed. 
VI.  PCAIDS AND THE MERGER GUIDELINES SAFEHARBORS 
In this section we briefly discuss some applications of our simulation analysis 
to the evaluation of safeharbor rules for unilateral effects.  A safeharbor offers a 
boundary below which transactions are not likely to be challenged, thereby reducing 
transactions costs and conserving enforcement resources.  The Merger Guidelines 
suggest two alternative safeharbors with respect to unilateral effects.  The first applies 
when the combined market share of the merging firms is less than 35%; the other is 
available when the change in the HHI is less than 50 (with a pre-transaction HHI over 
1,800) or less than 100 (with a pre-transaction HHI between 1,000 and 1,800).
59  
                                                 
59 The Horizontal Merger Guidelines at ¶2.211 and ¶2.22 leave open the possibility of 
finding significant unilateral effects when the merging firms have combined market 
shares of less than 35%, indicating that this criterion is not equal in importance to 
the HHI safeharbor.  For simplicity, however, we will refer to the 35% standard as a 
safeharbor and investigate its properties.   
      34 
If taken literally, the 35% safeharbor would shelter transactions from review 
for unilateral effects when the merging firms have shares as large as 17.5% each, 
magnitudes that might not be uncommon.  To evaluate this safeharbor, we used 
PCAIDS (and reasonable elasticity assumptions) to investigate potential unilateral 
effects when the merging firms have a combined share of 35%.
60  The results 
indicated price increases of 6% or more for at least one of the merging firms, 
irrespective of firm size.  The simulations suggest that a 35% safeharbor runs too 
great a risk of sheltering anticompetitive transactions.   
Moreover, we note that the 35% standard, if enforced, would make the HHI 
safeharbor virtually irrelevant for analyzing unilateral effects.  The only mergers not 
already protected by the 35% rule that would be sheltered by the change in the HHI 
would be of minimal interest.  Indeed, in these circumstances the smaller merging 
firm could have at most a 1.5% share (pre-transaction HHI between 1,000 and 1,800) 
or a 0.7% share (pre-transaction HHI over 1,800).  These constraints are inherent in 
the mathematics associated with the existing safeharbors (see Section 5 of the 
Appendix for details), and are not dependent on our merger simulation analysis.   
We have separate concerns about the HHI safeharbor in cases involving 
unilateral effects.  The HHI safeharbor by itself shelters relatively few mergers 
because it is only satisfied when the smaller merging firm has at most a 7% share 
(pre-transaction HHI between 1,000 and 1,800) or a 5% share (pre-transaction HHI 
over 1,800).  Again, as shown in the Appendix, these limits follow directly from the 
definition of the safeharbor in the Merger Guidelines.  By “protecting” only mergers 
involving relatively low market shares, the HHI safeharbors pose a low risk of 
unilateral effects.  This was confirmed by PCAIDS simulations that yielded 
maximum price increases under 5%.
61   
                                                 
60 The simulations used an industry elasticity of –1, a brand elasticity of –3 for the 
first merger partner, and a third firm with a 65% share.  There were no efficiencies 
or nests. 
61 The HHI simulations used an industry elasticity of –1, a brand elasticity of –3 for 
the first merger partner, and merging parties ranging from equal 5% shares to 24% 
and 1% shares, and a third firm with the residual share.    
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At the same time, it is natural to ask whether there is a basis for an alternative 
safeharbor (perhaps tied to the HHI or the sum of market shares) that could expedite a 
greater number of merger reviews while providing similar protection against 
anticompetitive transactions.
62  For example, our preliminary investigation suggests 
that a 25% safeharbor would typically generate unilateral effects below 5%, using 
similar assumptions as before.  Moreover, the weighted average price increase for the 
merged firm will be even smaller when the merger partners are different sizes.  We 
realize, of course, that the choice of an alternative safeharbor is a complex question 
that will involve substantial further study.  However, the benefits in the form of 
reduced enforcement and transaction costs could make this a worthwhile effort. 
VII.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Merger simulation can be u sed to evaluate many transactions that raise 
competitive concerns.  It adds to the information provided by methods that rely on 
econometrically estimated demand systems, surveys of consumer preferences, and the 
analytical strategies described in the Horizontal Merger Guidelines.  The PCAIDS 
simulation approach presented in this article represents a simplification over existing 
techniques that we believe offers advantages in many applications.  It requires only  
aggregate market shares, the industry price elasticity, and the own-price elasticity for 
a single brand in the relevant market.  We have also shown that this approach can be 
easily extended to accommodate additional information on substitution and diversion 
patterns by constructing product nests.  It allows a range of sophisticated analyses at 
relatively low cost.  We have provided examples that evaluate efficiencies, nesting, 
brand divestiture, and entry/repositioning.   
Our work is also relevant to recent criticisms of the use of market shares, 
especially in the form of HHIs, for merger analysis.  PCAIDS shows that market 
                                                 
62 Other researchers who advocate simulation have found little support for the 35% 
rule and have concluded that the existing HHI criterion “makes sense only if one 
believes either that mergers are likely to generate no efficiencies or that only 
consumer welfare should be considered in merger cases.”  See Gregory J. Werden 
and Luke M. Froeb, “Simulation as an Alternative to Structural Merger Policy in 
Differentiated Products Industries,” in Malcolm B. Coate and Andrew N. Kleit, 
eds., The Economics of the Antitrust Process 77 (1996).   
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shares can be highly informative when combined with well-grounded economic 
principles.  In our view, the PCAIDS model justifies renewed reliance on market 
shares as a pragmatic benchmark to assess competition.  We note that the Merger 
Guidelines themselves spell out the option of using market shares in an analysis of 
unilateral effects when market shares are reliable indicators of the closeness of 
substitutes and demand (which are essentially the conditions under which the 
proportionality assumption is appropriate).  
Merger simulation is evolving and its techniques are improving.  We expect 
that PCAIDS can help establish simulation as a standard tool to analyze potential 
unilateral effects.  We hope that the methods introduced in this article will provide a 
basis to evaluate options and possibilities that might otherwise be quite difficult to 
subject to quantitative analysis.    




Merger simulation builds on a demand-supply model that specifies a set of 
equations that relate three types of information for the brands in the relevant market: 
i) own and cross-price elasticities, ii) market shares, and iii) gross profit margins.  
The demand model implies a “first-order condition” (“FOC”) for each brand, which 
specifies necessary mathematical relationships among these variables under the 
assumption that the firms in the market are maximizing profits without engaging in 
overt collusion.  Each FOC involves the elasticities, shares, and margins both for that 
brand and for all of the other brands in the relevant market owned by the same firm.  
In this way the FOCs take into account possible trade-offs in pricing that are the 
primary source of unilateral effects. 
1.   Notation and Assumptions 
A.  There are n firms in the relevant market, each producing ni brands.  There are 
N brands in total. 
B.  The jth brand has the following characteristics: 
1.  Average price pj 
2.  Quantity qj 
3.  Share sj of revenues in the relevant market  
4.  Own-price elasticity ejj and cross-price elasticities ejk 
5.  Incremental cost cj and profit margin mj = (pj – cj)/pj. 
C.  The average industry price is P, calculated as lnP = ￿silnpi, for i = 1 to N.  
Also, DP/P = ￿si(Dpi/pi). 
D.  The n firms face an aggregate industry demand curve with  a (pre-merger) 
price elasticity of e.  An estimate of the percentage change in industry revenue 
due to industry-wide price changes is D(￿piqi)/ ￿piqi = DP/P(e+1). 
E.  There is at least one known own-price elasticity ejj.  Each known own-price 
elasticity is larger in magnitude than the industry elasticity e, abs(ejj) > abs(e), 
where abs(.) is the absolute value function. 
F.  Define the brand-specific vectors s = (s1, s2, …, sN)´ for market shares, p = (p1, 
p2, …, pN)´ for prices, c = (c1, c2, …, cN)´ for incremental costs, and m = (m1, 
m2, …, mN)´ for margins. 
G.  Define the brand-specific vector d = (d1, d2,…, dN)´of exponential rates of 
price changes due to the transaction.  Each dj= ln(pj
post)– ln(pj
pre).  Define the  
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brand-specific vector g = (g1, g2, …, gN)´of percentage changes in incremental 
costs due to the transaction.  Each gj = cj
post / cj
pre – 1.   
H.  Define the matrices S = diag(s), G =diag(1+g), and D =diag(exp(d)). 
I.  For the brands produced by the ith firm, define the ni by ni matrix Ei with 
element (k, j) equal to ejk.  That is, Ei is the transposed matrix of own-price 
and cross-price elasticities.   
J.  Define the solution vector d
* of price changes measured at compound rates as 
exp(d)–1.  The FOCs are solved using the d vector
 and the conversion to d
* 
expresses the solution in more convenient units.   
2.  General First-Order Conditions for Merger Simulation 
  There is a FOC equation for each brand in the market.  A general expression 
for all of the FOCs is given by the matrix equation: 
  s + diag(E1, E2, …, En)Sm = 0.    
  The first stage of a simulation is used to calculate the brand-specific margins 
m.  Assuming the pre-transaction shares and elasticities are known, the margins are 
given by: 
  m
pre = – S
–1diag(E1, E2, …, En)
–1s.  (A1) 
The second stage analyzes the FOCs to predict price changes due to the 
transaction.  In general, the post-transaction shares, elasticities, and margins are 
functions of the price changes.  To simplify the notation, assume that the merger 
involves firms n–1 and n.  There are n–1 firms in the post-transaction market, but the 
number of brands remains N.  The merged firm requires a new cross-elasticity matrix 
E
*
n–1 for the nn–1 plus nn brands it is now producing.  The FOCs for the second stage 
are: 
  s + diag(E1, E2, …, E
*
n–1)Sm = 0,  (A2) 
where all variables are understood to be taken at their post-transaction values.    
To understand the solution of (A2), consider the relation between  m
pre and 
m
post.  For the jth brand,  
  cj
pre  = (1 – mj
pre) pj
pre 
It follows from the definitions that cj
post = (1–gj)cj
pre and that pj
post = exp(dj)pj
pre.  As a 
result, 
  mj
post  = 1 – cj
post/pj
post   
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  = 1 – (1 – mj
pre) (1–gj)/exp(dj) . 
This relationship can be expressed in matrix notation for all brands as 
  m
post = 1 – GD
–1(1 – m
pre), 
where 1 is an N vector of ones.   
The second stage FOC can now be written as a function of the percentage 
price changes: 
s + diag(E1, E2, …, E
*
n–1)S [1 – GD
–1(1 – m
pre)] = 0,  (A3) 
where the price changes also generate post-transaction shares and elasticities through 
the demand model.  That is, the solution to (A3) is framed entirely in terms of finding 
the vector d that solves the system of equations.  Observe that the pre-transaction 
prices and costs p
pre and c
pre are not needed in the analysis. 
Simulation of divestiture of a brand from the ith firm to the jth firm is 
accomplished by suitable definition of the price elasticity matrices.  The rows and 
columns corresponding to the brands to be divested are deleted from Ei.  When the jth 
firm is an incumbent in the market, Ej is augmented by a new row and a new column 
containing the own-price elasticity and the cross-price elasticities with the other 
brands for the firm.  For divestiture to an entrant, the number of firms in the post-
transaction market increases by one and an additional elasticity matrix is defined that 
consists of a single element equal to the own-price elasticity for the divested brand. 
3.   Properties of AIDS 
A.  Share Equations 
Associated with the ith firm are ni equations that model changes in brand-
specific shares.  They take the form dsik = ￿bijdpj/pj, where j = 1, …, N and k = 1, …, 
ni.  We omit the AIDS expenditure terms in our analysis as a convenient 
simplification.  The system can be written in matrix notation as ds = Bd, where B is 
the N by N matrix of b’s.  The vector of pre-transaction shares s
pre is assumed known.  
The post-transaction shares are s
post = s
pre + Bd. 
The “adding-up” property requires the shares of all the brands in the market to 
always sum to one.  Since this identity holds for any set of price changes, it implies 
for any j that ￿bij = 0, i = 1, …, N.  Adding-up makes one of the equations redundant  
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because its coefficients can be completely expressed in terms of the coefficients from 
the other equations. 
The homogeneity property requires shares to be unaffected by a uniform 
percentage change in all prices in the model.  It implies for any i that ￿bij = 0, j = 1, 
…, N.  Homogeneity makes one of the prices in the model redundant because its 
coefficients can be completely expressed in terms of the coefficients for the other 
prices in the same equation. 
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4.  Properties of PCAIDS 
A.  PCAIDS Calibration of the Demand System 
We now show that PCAIDS can be fully calibrated regardless of the number 
of brands in the market, using only information on the own-price elasticity of demand 
for a single brand, the industry price elasticity of demand, and the market share data.  
The same result holds for the extension of the method using nests.   
Each element of B can be written as bik = qikbkk, where the q’s are known but 
the diagonal elements bkk are unknown.  The relative share diversion between brand i 
and brand j for a price change in brand k is given by the odds ratio qik / qjk.  For 
example, under strict proportionality  qik = –si/(1–sk) and the odds ratio equals si/sj.   
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Impose adding-up and homogeneity.  The constraints imply a system of  N–1 
independent equations in the  N unknown own-coefficients.  Without loss of 
generality, assume that e11 is known.  We normalize with respect to the first brand 
and define a vector b with N–1 elements equal to bjj/b11 = bj, j > 1.  The equation 
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(A6) can be inverted to solve for the b vector, which will be a function of the market 
shares.  It can be shown that each bi equals (1–si)/(1–s1)(si/s1).   
Since e11 and e are known, we can invert the formula for own-price elasticity 
to find  )) 1 ( 1 ( 1 11 1 11 + - + = e s e s b .  The PCAIDS system can therefore be calibrated 
completely using market shares and the two elasticities. 
We now prove that each PCAIDS own-price elasticity is larger in magnitude 
than the industry elasticity.  By assumption, abs(e11) > abs(e).  Assume that abs(eii) < 
abs(e) for some i > 1.  Substituting bii=(1–si)/(1–sj)(si/sj)b11 in the expression for the 
own price elasticity for eii yields the contradiction that abs(e11) < abs(e). 
Finally, we prove that all PCAIDS cross-price elasticities are greater than 
zero.  Suppose  eik < 0 for some i, k.  By substitution, this implies  –bkk/(1–
sk)+sk(e+1)<0.  Substitute for  bkk in terms of  ekk, and rearrange yielding the 
implication ((ekk+1)–sk(e+1))sk > (1–sk)sk(e+1).  However, since ekk < e, this is a 
contradiction. 
B.  PCAIDS Nests 
Assume that there are w nests, w £ N, with each brand assigned to a nest.  
Given a price increase for brand k in nest f1, the diversion of share to brand i in nest f2 
deviates from proportionality by a multiplicative factor w(k, i) > 0.  We assume that 
w(k, i) = w(i, k).  Similarly, the diversion from brand k to brand j in nest f 3 deviates  
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from proportionality by w(k, j).  Proportionality is the special case where w(k, i) = 1.  








s ? , 
The odds ratio under nesting is  qik/qjk = ( si/sj)[w(k,i)/w(k,j)].  In the case of 
proportionality for all nests this reduces to the familiar si/sk.   
C.  Slutsky Symmetry of B with PCAIDS 
We now show that the matrix B of PCAIDS coefficients is symmetric both 
under strict proportionality and with nests as we have defined them.  The discussion 
















and from before, bjj = bjb11. 
By the definition of B and substitution for bi and bj,  
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for i„j.  Symmetry of B follows directly.  
D.  Required Market Share for Entry to Defeat Unilateral Effects 
Let a represent the unilateral output reduction.  For any brand produced by 
the merged firm, post-transaction revenue  p
postq
post is related to pre-transaction 
revenue p
preq








* is the unilateral percentage price increase.  Total post-transaction market 
revenue equals pre-transaction market revenue PQ multiplied by 1+(e+1)dP/P, where 
P is the average market price change ((see 1D).  Dividing both sides of the equation 
by post-transaction market revenue yields 
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Re-write in terms of shares as  
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5.  Proof of Maximum Firm Sizes under Merger Guidelines Safeharbors  
When the 35% safeharbor rule does not apply, then the HHI safeharbor has 
independent relevance only for transactions where one of the firms is very small.  By 
the algebra of the HHI (see Merger Guidelines at footnote 18), the safeharbor for 
merging firms 1 and 2 can be expressed as: 
  2s1s2 < d,  
where d, the maximum safeharbor change in the HHI, is either 100 (pre-HHI less than 
1800) or 50 (pre-HHI greater than 1800).  It follows that s2 < d/(2s1).   
By assumption, s1 + s2 > 35%, so that  s2 > 35% – s1.  Putting these two 
conditions together implies 
35% – s1 < d/(2s1),  
or, equivalently, 
s1
2 – 35s1 + d/2 > 0. 
Apply the quadratic formula, assuming the expression is equal to zero, and solve for 
the two possible values for  s1.  The inequality is then satisfied when  s1 is either 
smaller than the lower value (and s2 > 35% – s1) or greater than the higher value (and 
s2 < d/(2s1).  By substituting for d, it can be seen that the HHI safeharbor limits the 
smaller merging firm to at most a 1.5% share (pre-transaction HHI between 1,000 and 
1,800) and a 0.7% share (pre-transaction HHI over 1,800) 
  It also follows that when the maximum safeharbor change in the HHI is 50, 
then the smaller firm can be no larger than 5% (and must be below this level when the 
share of the larger firm is above 5%).  When the maximum safeharbor change is 100, 
then the smaller firm can be no larger than 7.1% and must be below 5% when the 
share of the larger firm is above 10%. 
 